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This paper addresses one of the major causes of the sub-prime mortgage crisis prevalent 
in large American mortgage houses by the end of 2006. The moral hazard scenario and 
consequent malpractices are addressed with respect to the soft budget constraint. This 
analysis is done by first looking at the Dewatripont and Maskin model (1995), and 
then suitably modifying it to model the scenario at a typical mortgage lender. This sim-
plistic model provides useful insight into how heightened bailout expectations, caused 
by precedent actions by the Federal Reserve, fueled risky behavior at banks who thought 
themselves to be “too-large-to-fail.”
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Over the last two decades there has been considerable 
interest in the study of financial crises and instabil-
ity owing largely to the prevalence of financial crises in 
the recent past. As Alan Greenspan observed, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc at the end of the Cold War, 
market capitalism spread rapidly through the develop-
ing world, largely displacing the discredited doctrine of 
central planning (Greenspan 2007). This abrupt transi-
tion led to explosive growth that was at times too hot 
to handle and inadequately controlled, causing several 
crises in the Third World, most notably in East Asia in 
1997 and Russia in 1998. Additionally, there have been 
periods of economic tumult in the developed world in-
cluding the near collapse of Japan in 1990’s, the bailout 
of Long Term Capital Management by the Federal Re-
serve in 1998, and most recently, the subprime mort-
gage crisis of 2007-08.
As Dimitrios Tsomocos highlights in his paper on finan-
cial instability, “[t]he difficulty in analyzing financial 
instability lies in the fact that most of the crises mani-
fest themselves in a unique manner and almost always 
require different policies for their tackling” (Tsomocos 
2003). Most explanations, however, are modeled on a 
game-theoretic  framework involving a moral hazard 
scenario  brought about by asymmetric information. 
This choice of framework has been popular because of 
its ability to predict equilibrium behavior (under rea-
sonable assumptions) for a given scenario and explain 
qualitatively and mathematically why and when devia-
tions from this behavior occur.
This paper aims to perform a similar introductory anal-
ysis of one of the underlying causes of the current global 
economic crisis — subprime mortgage lending activity 
in the US from 2001-07 — in light of the soft budget 
constraint (SBC). The soft budget constraint syndrome, 
identified by János Kornai in his study of economic be-
havior of centrally-planned economies (1986), has been 
used to explain several phenomena and crises in the 
capitalist world. While initially used to explain short-
age in socialist economies, the SBC has been usefully 
sought to provide explanations for the Mexican crisis of 
1994, the collapse of the banking sector of East Asian 
economies in the 1990’s, and the collapse of the Long 
Term Credit Bank of Japan.
The soft budget constraint syndrome is said to arise 
when a seemingly unprofitable enterprise is bailed out 
by the government or its creditors. This injection of 
capital in dire situations ‘softens’ the budget constraint 
for the enterprise – the amount of capital it has to work 
with is no longer a hard, fixed amount. There is a host of 
literature, primarily developed from a model designed 
by Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin, which fo-
cuses on the moral hazard issues brought about when 
a government or central bank acts as the lender of last 
resort to financial institutions (Kornai et al. 2003).
BaCkground
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 was marked by 
a sharp rise in United States home foreclosures at the 
end of 2006 and became a global financial crisis during 
2007 and 2008. The crisis began with the bursting of 
the speculative bubble in the US housing market and 
high default rates on subprime adjustable rate mortgag-
es made to higher-risk borrowers with lower income or 
lesser credit history than prime borrowers.
Several causes for the proliferation of this crisis to all 
sectors of the economy have been delineated, including 
excessive speculative investment in the US real estate 
market, the overly risky bets investment houses placed 
on mortgage backed securities and credit swaps, inac-
curate credit ratings and valuation of these securities, 
and the inability of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to monitor and audit the level of debt and risk 
borne by large financial institutions. It would be fair to 
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say, however, that one of the most fundamental causes 
of the entire debacle was the lending practices prevalent 
in mortgage houses in the US by the end of 2006 and 
the free hand given to these lenders to continue their 
practices. While securitization produced complex de-
rivatives from these mortgages that were incorrectly val-
ued and risk-appraised, it was ultimately the misguided 
decisions made by mortgage lenders that caused default 
rates to rise when the housing bubble burst, eroding the 
value of the underlying assets and setting off a chain re-
action in the financial sector.
With housing prices on the rise since 2001, borrowers 
were encouraged to assume adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARM) or hybrid mortgages, believing they would be 
able to refinance at more favorable terms later. How-
ever, once housing prices started to drop moderately in 
2006-2007 in many parts of the U.S., refinancing be-
came more difficult. Defaults and foreclosures increased 
dramatically as ARM interest rates reset higher. During 
2007, nearly 1.3 million U.S. housing properties were 
subject to foreclosure activity, up 75% versus 2006. (US 
Foreclosure Activity 2007).
Primary mortgage lenders had passed a lot of the de-
fault risk of subprime loans to third party investors 
through securitization, issuing mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). 
Therefore, as the housing market soured, the effects 
of higher defaults and foreclosures began to tell sig-
nificantly on financial markets and especially on major 
banks and other financial institutions, both domesti-
cally and abroad. These banks and funds have reported 
losses of more than U.S. $500 billion as of August 2008 
(Onaran 2008). This heavy setback to the financial sec-
tor ultimately led to a stock markets decline. This dou-
ble downturn in the housing and stock markets fuelled 
recession fears in the US, with spillover effects in other 
economies, and prompted the Federal Reserve to cut 
down short term interest rates significantly, from 5.25% 
in August ’07 to 3.0% in February ’08 and subsequently 
down all the way to 0.25% in December ’08 (Historical 
Changes, 2008).
As the single largest mortgage financing institution 
in the US, Countrywide Financial felt the heat of the 
subprime crisis more than a lot of the other affected fi-
nancial institutions. Faced with the double whammy of 
a housing market crash and the stiff credit crunch, the 
company found itself in a downward spiral, with a rise 
in readjusted mortgage rates increasing the number of 
foreclosures which eroded profits.
In the case of Countrywide Financial and other large 
finance corporations who considered themselves “too-
large-to-fail,” the expectation of the downside risk cov-
erage was raised to a level that promoted substantial 
risk-taking. This expectation was based off of precedent 
actions by the Federal Reserve in bailing out distressed 
large firms – dubbed the Greenspan (and now, the Ber-
nanke) put. Thomas Walker (2008), in his article in The 
Wall Street Journal, aptly says, 
There is tremendous irony, and common sense, 
in the realization that multiple successful rescues 
of the financial system by the Fed over several 
decades will eventually create a risk-taking cul-
ture that even the Fed will no longer be able to 
single-handedly save, at least not without serious 
inflationary consequences or help from foreign-
ers to avoid a dollar collapse. Eventually the cul-
ture will overwhelm the ability of the authorities 
to make it all better. 
Ethan Penner of Nomura Capital provides a succinct 
and veracious definition of the moral hazard dilemma 
in saying that, “Consequences not suffered from bad de-
cisions lead to lessons not learned, which leads to bigger 
failings down the road (Penner 2008).” 
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the dewatripont Maskin 
(dM) Model
Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin developed a 
model in 1995 to explain the softening of the budget 
constraint under centralized and decentralized credit 
markets (Dewatripont et al. 1995). The simplest version 
of their model is a two-period model, with the key play-
ers being a banker that serves as the source of capital to 
each of a set of entrepreneurs that require funding to 
undertake projects. At the beginning of period 1, each 
of the entrepreneurs chooses a project to submit for 
financing, and projects may be defined as one of two 
types: good or poor. The probability of a project being 
good is α. The asymmetry in information lies in the fact 
that once selected, only the entrepreneur knows of the 
type of the project, i.e. the banker is unable to monitor 
the project beforehand. The entrepreneur has no bar-
gaining power and the banker, if he decides to finance 
the project, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Set-up funding costs 1 unit of capital. The banker is 
able to learn the nature of a project once he funds set-
up during period 1. A good project, once funded, yields 
a monetary return of Rg (>0) and a private benefit Bg 
(>0) for the entrepreneur; by the beginning of period 2, 
gains can be made through private benefits, which may 
include intangibles such as reputation enhancement. 
A poor project, on the other hand, yields a monetary 
return of 0 by the beginning of period 2. If the banker 
ends up dealing with a poor project, he, at the beginning 
of period 2, has the option of either liquidating the proj-
ect’s assets to obtain a liquidation value L (>0) while 
the entrepreneur earns a private benefit BL (<0), since 
liquidation would imply a loss in reputation. The other 
option the banker has is to refinance the project, which 
would require the injection of another unit of capital at 
the beginning of period 2. Now the gross return is Rp 
and private benefit to the entrepreneur is Bp (>0). 
A graphical representation of the timing and structure 
of the DM model is shown in Figure 1.
The fairly simple model proposed by Dewatripont and 
Maskin, when suitably tweaked, may be used to explain 
a number of phenomena in both capitalist and socialist 
economies. The model was originally designed to assess 
how decentralizing the credit market (under some fairly 
reasonable assumptions about the comparative nature of 
Rg and Rp) will harden the budget constraint — mak-
ing markets more efficient — by adding incentive to en-
trepreneurs to not submit poor projects for financing.
For specific application to this study, the model will 
be used to study the moral hazard scenario that comes 
about when financial institutions consider themselves 
“too-large-to-fail.” These institutions, Long Term Capi-
tal Management in the late 1990’s and, more recently, 
Countrywide Financial, are insured to some measure in 
the sense that their multi-billion-dollar positions can 
affect financial markets so heavily that, in the case of a 
Figure 1. The Structure of the Dewatripont Maskin 
Model (Source: Kornai et al., 2003)
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downturn, large private banks, the central bank, or the 
government would be forced to bail them out to avoid 
a financial meltdown. This insurance against downside 
risk stimulates the moral hazard scenario and gives in-
centive to these financial institutions to make much 
riskier bets with higher potential return.
Methodology
The game-theoretic model used in this study has two 
key players – the borrowing entity (“borrower”) and 
the lending entity (“the bank”). Additionally, the study 
looks at the effects of the presence of a lender of last 
resort. Borrowers, assumed to be identical, can choose 
from two types of loans offered by the bank – a fixed 
rate loan with principal Lf and an adjustable rate loan 
with principal La. Customer utility (U(x)) in the typical 
concave functional form – increasing with decreasing 
marginal returns (i.e. U'>0, U''<0), is simplified in this 
model to be the natural logarithm function. 
The fixed rate loan has an interest rate rf . The adjustable 
rate loan is assumed to have an initial low fixed interest 
rate r0a which is readjusted after a period λ. The remain-
der of the adjustable rate loan is paid off at the rate de-
termined at the end of period λ. If market conditions are 
good at this time, the interest rate is adjusted to r1g, and 
if they are bad, the rate is adjusted to r1b. Market condi-
tions are represented in the model by an exogenous vari-
able θ, which is the probability of the market conditions 
being good, i.e. of the interest rate reset to being r1g. 
The bank and customer convene before a loan is offered 
to discuss the terms of the ARM. Based on the bank’s 
expectations about the economy (i.e. θ) and of the val-
ues of r1b and r1g, the bank and the customer decide 
on a fixed initial rate r0a and a period λ for which the 
loan is kept fixed. The computation for λ also involves a 
parameter, δ, which reflects the increase in default rate 
for bad market conditions. This revenue shrinkage fac-
tor (δ) can be thought of as an indicator of the bank’s 
downside risk coverage. In the current framework, it is 
affected by two key factors:
1. Collateral requirements: Higher collateral would 
imply more downside risk coverage (i.e. higher δ) but 
would also reduce the quantity of loans demanded since 
fewer people would be able to pay the required collater-
al for the same loan. The bank would therefore evaluate 
the benefit (potential revenue) of additional loans with 
the cost (increased risk) to choose the ideal collateral 
requirement for the ARM. This cost-benefit analysis is 
however outside the scope of this study, and δ is there-
fore assumed to be exogenous.
2. Bail-out expectations: Increased expectations of a 
bail-out (i.e. a cash injection in case of bad market con-
ditions) would also raise the value of δ, but without 
shrinkage in loan demand.
The game is played between borrowers and the bank 
with equilibrium being reached by the bank setting λ 
such that borrowers are indifferent to either of the two 
loans, and the borrowers opting for a mixed strategy. 
The indifferent borrower chooses a fixed rate loan with 
a probability α such that the expected payoff from either 
loan is the same for the bank.
This study analyzes the equilibrium of this game under 
two scenarios – with and without the presence of a lend-
er of last resort. The presence of a lender of last resort 
who is expected to bail the lender out with a cash injec-
tion increases the (perceived) value of δ even though the 
level of protection offered to the bank through collateral 
remains the same. So, in this case, the revenue shrinkage 
for the second collection period is reduced (Figure 2).
The optimal loan amount for a fixed rate loan (L*f ) 
maximizes net utility for the borrower. Net utility is 
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the difference between the utility gained from the loan 
amount less the total interest paid over the lifetime of 
the load. The borrower therefore solves,
                                   
i.e.         
                        
which yields,
            (1)
           
With an adjustable rate loan, the interest payment for 
the average borrower would be
          
Therefore, the optimal loan amount for an adjustable 
rate loan,   
                                                (2)
        
In order to ensure that a mixed strategy is employed at 
equilibrium i.e. to have 0<α<1, the bank sets λ such that 
borrowers are indifferent to fixed and adjustable rate 
loans.
  
Substituting values from (1) & (2), we obtain,
i.e. 
        
Figure 2. Readjustment of adjustable rate loans after the initial period, λ.
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giving us,
                                                   (3)
               
analysis
In deriving equation (3) above, we also find that, at equi-
librium, the net interest rate charged for a fixed loan and 
an adjustable loan are the same.
i.e. 
         
Since all interest rates and parameters are positive, and 
since r0a is assumed to be less than rf , the above can only 
hold true if
                 (4)
          
Also, it must hold that,
                  (5)
                   
This is derived from equation (4) and from the fact that, 
as market conditions worsen, liquidity becomes harder 
to obtain and therefore the cost of debt increases.
Equilibrium behavior that is of interest is the nature of 
the change in λ with changes in the exogenous param-
eters – θ and δ. The rate of change of λ with respect θ 
to is
                                  (6)
      
Given condition (4), the sign on the above expression is 
dependent on the sign of (r1g – δ·r1b). Therefore, if    
          
then the right hand side of equation (6) would be posi-
tive, implying that an increase in the probability of a 
good market conditions would cause an increase in the 
amount of time that the loan is kept at the low fixed rate 
r0a. This makes intuitive sense because if  
                                          
then the bank is not adequately covered against down-
side risk,  so even though the probability of good market 
conditions increases, the bank keeps the loan at the fixed 
low rate longer and decreases the length of the period of 
uncertain collection, which is subject to downside risk. 
One concern that arises is why the bank takes any risk 
in the first place by offering an adjustable rate loan even 
though the payoff for this is the same as that for the less 
risky fixed rate loan. The reasoning here would be that 
adjustable rate loans earn higher commissions, which 
compensates to some level for this risk. Additionally, 
ARMs are preferred by more customers, and they there-
fore add intangible value in terms of higher volumes, 
which may lead to lower costs, better customer satisfac-
tion and a broader clientele. Also, since the function for 
λ is a rational function in θ (see equation 3), we can see 
that the values of r0a, r1b, and r1g need to fall within a 
certain range to ensure that an ARM is feasible i.e. λ lies 
between 0 & 1.
Conversely, if  
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then the bank is covered against downside risk. The 
right hand side of equation (6) is now negative, so an 
increase in the probability of good market conditions 
extends the length of the period of uncertain collection. 
Additionally, if  
                        
then the bank is independent of nature of market con-
ditions i.e. independent of θ. However, since δ is not 
set arbitrarily by the bank, it cannot always pursue this 
strategy of hedging against market risk (Figure 3).
As mentioned earlier, the presence of a lender of last 
resort inflates the value of δ without any collateral in-
crease. From figure 3 we see that as δ increases, there are 
three ways in which the bank begins to take up more 
risk. A rise in the value of δ increases the feasibility of 
adjustable rate loans – loans that were not feasible for 
a given economic outlook (i.e. θ value) now start be-
coming feasible even though the bank is not adequately 
covered against this higher level of risk from its collat-
eral collection. Additionally, a rise in δ decreases the 
sensitivity of λ with respect to θ. A higher δ therefore 
prompts less vigilant observation of market conditions 
as small enough changes in market outlook now man-
date less significant changes in loan structure. Finally, if 
δ is raised to high enough value,
then the bank begins to make counter-intuitive deci-
sions, and a decrease in the probability of good market 
conditions now actually brings about an increase in the 
period of uncertain collection.
ConClusion
This model, albeit simplistic, provides interesting re-
sults. The model is designed to mimic the basic setup 
at a typical mortgage house offering a fixed rate loan 
and a two-step adjustable rate loan. We are able to show, 
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mathematically, that an increase in the expectation of a 
bailout by a lender of last resort tends to encourage risky 
behavior in such mortgage offering agencies in multiple 
ways. That being said, there is plenty of scope for fur-
ther elaboration and sophistication of the model. The 
market structure currently under investigation is both 
simplistic and insular, but a more elaborate structure of 
markets and corresponding interactions could be de-
signed. For instance, a good example of possible market 
stratification is illustrated in Tsomocos (2003). Also, the 
current loan structure is a two period model with loans 
changing rates at the end of period one to a new fixed 
rate for period two. A more complex, multi-period loan 
structure could be investigated with the adjustable rate 
set as a random variable and a Markov chain approach 
used to study the equilibrium behavior in this scenario.
In their investigation of “federalism,” Qian and Ro-
land (1988) observe that giving fiscal authority to local 
governments instead of the central government works 
to limit the effects of the soft budget syndrome. They 
propose a three-tiered structure with local governments 
working between the central government and state and 
non-state enterprises. The competition among local 
governments to attract enterprises forces funds to be 
diverted in infrastructure development, increasing the 
opportunity cost of a bailout and thereby hardening 
the budget constraint for enterprises. A similar scenario 
could be envisioned where the Federal Reserve dis-
tributes the decision making authority (and funds) to 
bailout corporations between the twelve regional Fed-
eral Reserve Banks; and would be of interest to study 
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